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Adverse Selection (Hidden Attributes Problem)
The Market for 'Lemons' (Adverse Selection in the Used Car Market)
The 'market for lemons' is a famous economic model that illustrates how hidden attributes can lead to market failure. The model focuses on the used car market, where 'lemon' is a slang term for a vehicle discovered to be defective after it has been purchased. In this market, sellers possess private information about their vehicle's true quality, while buyers do not. This information gap forces prospective buyers to base their offers on the average quality of cars in the market, which can discourage owners of high-quality cars from selling and may result in a market dominated by low-quality 'lemons'.
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CORE Econ
Ch.10 Market successes and failures: The societal effects of private decisions - The Economy 2.0 Microeconomics @ CORE Econ
The Economy 2.0 Microeconomics @ CORE Econ
Introduction to Microeconomics Course
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Adverse Selection in Health Insurance
The Market for 'Lemons' (Adverse Selection in the Used Car Market)
Adverse Selection in Labor Markets
Identifying Adverse Selection Scenarios
A company starts offering an optional, premium warranty for its electronic devices at a fixed price. The warranty covers any and all repairs for three years. After one year, the company finds that it is losing a significant amount of money on this warranty program because the repair costs for the customers who bought it are far higher than anticipated. The company concludes that only the customers who are rough with their devices or suspect their specific device might have underlying issues were willing to pay the extra price for the warranty. Which economic principle best explains this outcome?
Rental Market Dynamics
Freelance Platform Pricing Strategy
Loan Market Interest Rate Policy
Adverse selection occurs in a market when one party changes their behavior in a risky way after entering into a contract, because they are no longer fully bearing the negative consequences of their actions.
In the classic economic example of the used car market, an information imbalance between buyers and sellers creates a specific type of market problem. Match each abstract component of this problem to its corresponding description in the used car market context.
A market is characterized by an information imbalance where sellers know the true quality of their goods, but buyers do not. This can lead to a negative outcome for the market as a whole. Arrange the following events in the logical order that describes how this problem unfolds.
When a market fails because one party in a transaction has private information about pre-existing, unobservable characteristics that the other party lacks, the resulting problem is known as ______. This can cause the quality of goods or the risk profile of participants remaining in the market to become undesirable from the uninformed party's perspective.
Evaluating Solutions to Adverse Selection in Insurance
Hiring Challenges in a Tech Startup
Adverse Selection as a Challenge for Home Price Insurance
In a market for used laptops, sellers know the exact condition and remaining lifespan of their device, but buyers cannot tell the difference between a high-quality and a low-quality machine before purchase. Buyers are aware that both types exist. Given this imbalance of knowledge, which of the following is the most likely consequence for the market?
Consider a market where sellers have perfect knowledge of their product's true quality, but potential buyers cannot distinguish between high-quality and low-quality items before a purchase. Buyers are, however, aware that a mix of qualities exists. Arrange the following events in the logical sequence that describes how such an information imbalance can cause the market to malfunction or even collapse.
Insurance Deductibles as a Screening Mechanism
Adverse Selection Leading to Missing Markets
Signalling (Economics)
Comparison of Adverse Selection in Health Insurance and Used Car Markets
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Hypothetical Used Car Market with Perfect Information
Buyer's Pricing Strategy Under Information Asymmetry in the 'Lemons' Market
Adverse Selection Resulting in a Low-Quality Equilibrium
Numerical Scenario for the 'Lemons' Market
Market Outcome with Hidden Information
Signaling in the Used Car Market
Screening in the Used Car Market
Role of Reputation and Intermediaries in the Used Car Market