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The Problem of Incomplete Contracts
Principal-Agent Problem
A principal-agent problem arises from a conflict of interest between a 'principal' and an 'agent' who is supposed to act on the principal's behalf. At its core, it is an information problem where the principal cannot ensure the agent's actions through an enforceable contract. This issue stems from two main types of information gaps: asymmetric information, where the agent knows something the principal doesn't (e.g., their own work effort), and non-verifiable information, where the principal might observe the agent's actions but cannot prove them to a third party like a court for enforcement.
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Library Science
Economics
Economy
Introduction to Microeconomics Course
Social Science
Empirical Science
Science
CORE Econ
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Firestone Tyres and Incomplete Contracts
Principal-Agent Problem
Verifiable Information
Performance-Based Pay
Learn After
Asymmetric Information in Principal-Agent Problems
Application: Non-Verifiable Information in Principal-Agent Problems
The Lender-Borrower Relationship as a Principal-Agent Problem
The Owner-Manager Relationship as a Principal-Agent Problem
Exercise: Evaluating Statements on the Principal-Agent Problem
Moral Hazard (Hidden Action Problem)
Sales Incentive Structure
A homeowner hires a contractor to complete a major kitchen renovation. The homeowner wants the highest quality materials and craftsmanship to maximize their property value, while the contractor, who is paid a fixed price for the job, might be tempted to use slightly cheaper materials or faster techniques to increase their profit margin. What is the fundamental economic problem illustrated by this scenario?
Public Project Management Scenario
Analyzing the Doctor-Patient Relationship
A publicly-traded company's shareholders (the owners) hire a CEO to run the company. The shareholders want to maximize long-term stock value. The CEO, whose compensation is partly tied to annual profits, might be tempted to cut research and development (R&D) spending to boost short-term earnings, even if it harms the company's future growth. The shareholders cannot perfectly observe whether the CEO's R&D decisions are genuinely for the company's long-term good or are self-serving. Match each element from this scenario to its corresponding concept within the relevant economic framework.
The principal-agent problem ceases to exist if the principal can perfectly observe the agent's actions, even if that observation cannot be proven to a third party.
Incentive Structures and Unintended Consequences
A tech startup founder, who is not a programmer, hires a freelance developer on a fixed-fee contract to build a mobile app. The founder wants clean, maintainable code for future updates, but can only verify that the app functions as specified. The developer's incentive is to finish quickly to maximize their effective hourly earnings, potentially by writing messy code that is hard to maintain. Which of the following contract adjustments would be the least effective at aligning the incentives of the founder and the developer?
A conflict of interest can arise when one party (an agent) is hired to act on behalf of another (a principal). This conflict often becomes a significant economic problem when the principal cannot fully monitor or enforce the agent's actions due to an information gap. In which of the following situations is this specific type of problem LEAST likely to be a major concern?
Evaluating an Environmental Cleanup Contract