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Asymmetric Information
George Akerlof
George Akerlof is a Nobel Prize-winning economist who, in 1970, first formally analyzed the market problems caused by asymmetric information. His foundational paper on the 'market for lemons,' which explores adverse selection, was initially rejected by academic journals as being either trivial or incorrect before its significance was recognized. Akerlof was awarded the Nobel Prize in 2001 for his contributions to this area of economics.
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Introduction to Microeconomics Course
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Ch.10 Market successes and failures: The societal effects of private decisions - The Economy 2.0 Microeconomics @ CORE Econ
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George Akerlof
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The market distortions caused by an imbalance of information only arise in situations where sellers possess more relevant information than buyers.
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A person who obtains a comprehensive car insurance policy may subsequently be less cautious about where they park their car or how they drive, knowing that the financial costs of theft or an accident are largely covered. This scenario is a primary example of adverse selection.
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Source: 'Phishing for Phools' by Akerlof and Shiller