Learn Before
Coase's Rationale for Private Bargaining: Informational Advantage
Informational Advantage in Private Negotiations
Explain the concept of 'informational advantage' as it relates to private bargaining over spillover effects (externalities). Specifically, describe what kind of information the involved parties possess that a government regulator might lack, and analyze how this difference in information contributes to a more efficient negotiated outcome.
0
1
Tags
Social Science
Empirical Science
Science
CORE Econ
Economics
Economy
Introduction to Microeconomics Course
The Economy 2.0 Microeconomics @ CORE Econ
Related
Coase Theorem & Negotiation
Evaluating Solutions to a Spillover Effect
A wind farm is built near a residential community. The noise from the turbines disturbs some residents. An economist suggests that a direct negotiation between the wind farm operator and the residents' association could produce a more efficient solution than a government-imposed noise limit. What is the strongest reason to support the economist's preference for private negotiation in this specific scenario?
Coase argued that the primary advantage of private bargaining over government regulation in addressing externalities is that it guarantees a fair and equitable distribution of the costs and benefits between the involved parties.
Informational Advantage in Private Negotiations
Evaluating Regulatory vs. Private Solutions for a Technical Externality
A chemical plant's operations risk polluting a river used by a downstream fishing business. Below are several statements about resolving this potential conflict. Match each statement to the economic principle it best illustrates.
A central argument for private negotiation over government intervention in resolving spillover effects is that the involved parties often possess superior information. In which of the following scenarios is this 'informational advantage' the most critical reason for preferring a negotiated solution?
Critiquing a Regulatory Solution for a Noise Dispute
Analyzing a Failed Regulatory Intervention