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  • Evaluating Substantive and Procedural Fairness in the Ultimatum Game

Perception of a 90-10 Split as Unfair in the Ultimatum Game

Based on observed behavior in experiments, an allocation in the ultimatum game where the Proposer claims 90% of the pie is widely perceived as substantively unfair by many participants. This illustrates a common judgment regarding the fairness of an outcome based on the inequality of the distribution itself.

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7 days ago

Contributors are:

Gemini AI
Gemini AI
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Who are from:

Google
Google
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References

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Library Science

Economics

Economy

Introduction to Microeconomics Course

Social Science

Empirical Science

Science

CORE Econ

Ch.5 The rules of the game: Who gets what and why - The Economy 2.0 Microeconomics @ CORE Econ

The Economy 2.0 Microeconomics @ CORE Econ

Related

  • Procedural Fairness in the Ultimatum Game vs. the Real Economy

  • Analyzing Fairness in an Economic Game

  • In a standard one-shot ultimatum game with a 100prize,theProposerofferstheResponder100 prize, the Proposer offers the Responder 5. The Responder rejects the offer, and as a result, both players receive $0. Which statement best analyzes the fairness of this situation?

  • Critique of Fairness in an Economic Interaction

  • Distinguishing Types of Fairness in an Economic Game

  • An economic game involves a 'Proposer' who suggests how to split $100 with a 'Responder'. The Responder can accept the split, or reject it, in which case neither person gets any money. Match each evaluative question below to the specific concept of fairness it addresses.

  • True or False: In an economic interaction where one person proposes how to divide a sum of money and a second person can only accept or reject the proposal (with rejection meaning neither person receives anything), the fact that the rules are transparent and applied equally to all participants is sufficient to guarantee that any final division of the money is also fair.

  • Evaluating Fairness in a Merit-Based Economic Interaction

  • Designing an Unfair Procedure

  • Modifying an Economic Game to Enhance Fairness

  • In an economic interaction, a 'Proposer' is given 100andmustsuggestadivisionofthemoneywitha′Responder′.TheRespondercaneitheraccepttheproposeddivision,inwhichcasethemoneyissplitassuggested,orrejectit,inwhichcaseneitherpersonreceivesanymoney.Therulesareknowntobothparticipantsinadvance.TheProposeroffers100 and must suggest a division of the money with a 'Responder'. The Responder can either accept the proposed division, in which case the money is split as suggested, or reject it, in which case neither person receives any money. The rules are known to both participants in advance. The Proposer offers 1 to the Responder, and the Responder accepts. Which statement best analyzes the fairness of this situation?

  • Influence of Coercion on the Perception of a Fair Outcome

  • Perception of a 90-10 Split as Unfair in the Ultimatum Game

Learn After

  • Decision Analysis in a One-Shot Bargaining Game

  • In a one-shot bargaining scenario, Person A is given 100andmustproposeasplittoPersonB.PersonBcaneitheracceptthesplit,inwhichcasetheybothgettheproposedamounts,orrejectit,inwhichcasebothget100 and must propose a split to Person B. Person B can either accept the split, in which case they both get the proposed amounts, or reject it, in which case both get 0. If Person A proposes to keep 90andgive90 and give 10 to Person B, which of the following best explains why Person B might reject the offer, based on common experimental observations?

  • Analyzing a Bargaining Outcome

  • Evaluating Motivations in a Bargaining Scenario

  • In a one-time, anonymous interaction, one person is given 100andmustproposeawaytosplititwithasecondperson.Thesecondpersoncaneitheraccepttheproposedsplit,inwhichcasetheybothreceivethemoneyasproposed,orrejectit,inwhichcasebothreceivenothing.Ifthefirstpersonproposestokeep100 and must propose a way to split it with a second person. The second person can either accept the proposed split, in which case they both receive the money as proposed, or reject it, in which case both receive nothing. If the first person proposes to keep 90 for themselves and give 10tothesecondperson,themostcommonoutcomeobservedinreal−worldexperimentsisthatthesecondpersonacceptstheofferbecausereceiving10 to the second person, the most common outcome observed in real-world experiments is that the second person accepts the offer because receiving 10 is financially better than receiving nothing.

  • In a one-time, anonymous interaction, a Proposer is given 100andmustofferasplittoaResponder.TheRespondercanaccept,andtheybothgettheproposedamounts,orreject,andtheybothget100 and must offer a split to a Responder. The Responder can accept, and they both get the proposed amounts, or reject, and they both get 0. Match each proposed offer from the Proposer to the most likely motivation behind the Responder's decision, based on common experimental findings.

  • Conflicting Motivations in a Bargaining Decision

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    Interaction 1: The Proposer offers to keep 90% and give 10% to the Responder. The Responder rejects the offer. Interaction 2: The Proposer offers to keep 60% and give 40% to the Responder. The Responder accepts the offer.

    Which of the following principles best explains the Responder's different decisions, even though rejecting in Interaction 1 meant forgoing a guaranteed monetary gain?

  • Evaluating a Prediction in a Bargaining Experiment

  • Critique of the Rational Actor Model in a Bargaining Context