A 2009 academic article by Peter T. Leeson, titled 'The Invisible Hook: The Law and Economics of Pirate Tolerance,' serves as a source for understanding pirate institutions. It was published in the New York University Journal of Law and Liberty, volume 4, issue 2, on pages 139–171.

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Figure 5.26 presents a comparison of Gini coefficients for spoils distribution, highlighting the stark contrast between pirate and naval systems. The pirate ship Royal Rover shows a Gini of just 0.06, indicating a highly egalitarian distribution. Conversely, the British Navy ships Favourite and Active exhibit much higher inequality, where ordinary sailors received only about a quarter of the prize money. This data supports the view that pirate societies were exceptionally democratic and fair for their time.

Figure 5.26: Inequality in Spoils Distribution Between Pirates and the British Navy

To cite the ebook, use The CORE Econ Team 2023 The Economy 2.0: Microeconomics Open access e-text https://core-econ.org/the-economy/.

To cite a unit, use The CORE Econ Team 2023 The Economy 2.0: Microeconomics Open access e-text https://core-econ.org/the-economy/ Unit [unit number] (url).

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Source: Leeson's 2009 Publication 'The Invisible Hook'

A historical account by Robert Beatson from 1804, titled 'Naval and Military Memoirs of Great Britain, from 1727 to 1783' (volume 3), provides source material on the British Royal Navy. This work was published by Longman, Hurst, Rees and Orme.

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