Representations express concepts or propositions, such as theories or taxonomies. The creation of a representation must not be mistaken for the creation of a fact. For example, when gravitational theory (a representation) was created, gravity itself (a fact) was not newly created.

Representations

Things that are considered to be known directly, as opposed to being known through theories. Examples of socially constructed facts include facts about being a US President and facts about being an Emotional Support Animal. 

General (Non-representational) Facts

Characteristics that are considered to be known about the way humans are (act, look, feel, etc.).

(Non-representational) Facts about Human Traits.

-  representations (e.g. ideas, theories, taxonomies)
- general non-representational facts 
- non-representational facts about human traits.


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The theory that what we consider “reality” is a collection of collaboratively constructed views of the world created through social interactions that then become the basis for shared assumptions, meanings, and ascribed values within a society.

Social Constructionism

Mallon, R. (2019, January 11). Naturalistic Approaches to Social Construction. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/social-construction-naturalistic/

Naturalistic Approaches to Social Construction

Types of Social Constructs

The social construction of race refers to how the concept and categories of race, as well as the meanings given to them, are not innate, but instead formed by society. While there are real physical traits that humans have, such as skin color, these traits do not exist in the format of clearly defined boxes that the concept “race” is structured as, nor do they correspond to any personal traits or values, a false belief that racism is built upon.

The Social Construction of Race

Kerschbaum argues that discourse extends beyond spoken or written language to encompass material objects, body language, and physical environments. By integrating perspectives from materialist disability studies and critical phenomenology, the author offers a theoretical counterbalance to purely social constructionist models, arguing that the material world serves as an "active co-participant" in the construction of disability. This approach insists on recognizing the "shared world-making" that occurs between material realities and social constructions.

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