A landowner makes a single, non-negotiable 'take-it-or-leave-it' wage offer to a potential worker. The landowner knows the exact combinations of work hours and pay that would make the worker indifferent to their next best alternative (their 'reservation' option). To maximize their own profit, why would the landowner propose a contract that gives the worker exactly this minimum level of satisfaction, and no more?

Software Contract Negotiation

Evaluating a Non-Optimal Bargaining Strategy

The Landowner's Offer

A powerful landowner is making a single, non-negotiable 'take-it-or-leave-it' offer to a farm worker. To maximize profit, the landowner should propose a contract that makes the worker slightly better off than their next best alternative. This ensures the worker will enthusiastically accept the offer, securing the deal for the landowner.

A monopolistic firm makes a single, non-negotiable 'take-it-or-leave-it' contract offer to a potential supplier. The firm's goal is to maximize its own profit. The supplier has a 'reservation indifference curve' which represents all contract combinations that are equally as good as their next best alternative. Match each type of offer the firm could make with its most likely outcome.

Food Truck Festival Negotiation

A firm with exclusive bargaining power is making a single, non-negotiable ('take-it-or-leave-it') offer to a worker. The graph below shows the worker's reservation indifference curve (the combinations of wages and free time that are equally as good as the worker's next best alternative), several of the firm's isoprofit curves (combinations that yield the same profit), and the feasible frontier. The firm's profit increases as it moves to isoprofit curves that are lower and to the right. Given tha

Surplus Distribution in a Take-it-or-Leave-it Offer

Evaluating the 'Participation at Reservation Utility' Assumption