Mathematically Deriving the Pareto Efficiency Curve for the Angela-Bruno Interaction

Improved Rights and Structural Power for Angela under New Legislation (Case 2)

Tenancy Contract in the Angela-Bruno Model

Sharecropping

Case 3 - Angela as an Employee with Democratic Rights

Figure 5.6 - Summary of Rules Across Different Cases

Assumptions of Constant and Self-Interested Preferences and Technology in the Angela-Bruno Model

Analysis of Institutional Rules and Economic Outcomes

Consider three different institutional settings for an interaction between a landowner and a farmer who works the land. Arrange these settings in order, from the one that gives the farmer the least bargaining power to the one that gives her the most.

Consider an economic interaction between a landowner who owns a farm and a farmer who works the land. Initially, the farmer's only alternative to working for the landowner is to survive on a very small plot of public land. A new law is passed that establishes a universal basic income grant for all citizens, which provides a higher standard of living than the public land. How does this new institutional rule most likely alter the final allocation of grain between the landowner and the farmer, assuming they reach a new agreement?

In an economic interaction between a landowner and a farmer, if the final agreed-upon distribution of the harvest is highly unequal, with the landowner receiving the vast majority of the output, this outcome is only possible if the landowner has the power to use physical force against the farmer.

Impact of Collective Bargaining on Allocations

The Link Between Institutional Rules and Economic Outcomes

Match each institutional scenario describing the rules of interaction between a landowner and a farmer with the most likely resulting economic outcome.

Consider an interaction where a landowner proposes a contract to a farmer to work his land. The total amount of grain produced depends on the hours the farmer works. Initially, the farmer's only alternative to accepting the contract is to receive a small government ration that guarantees her survival. A new law is then passed, which gives the farmer the right to refuse the contract and instead work her own small plot of land, which provides her with more grain than the government ration but less than she could get from a favorable contract with the landowner.

How does this change in the institutional setting affect the set of possible agreements between the farmer and the landowner?

An economist observes an interaction between a landowner and a landless farmer. The farmer works long hours and receives only enough grain to survive, while the landowner receives a large surplus. The economist concludes: 'This outcome is inherently inefficient because the distribution is so unequal.' Which of the following provides the most accurate critique of the economist's conclusion?

An economic interaction between a landowner and a farmer results in the farmer receiving a share of the harvest that is significantly above her biological survival needs but less than half of the total output. Which of the following institutional frameworks is the least plausible explanation for this specific outcome?

Framework for Comparing Outcomes Across Different Institutional Settings

Case 1: Forced Labor under Coercion

Welfare Comparison Across Angela-Bruno Scenarios (Baseline, Case 1, and Case 2)

Baseline Case: Angela's Optimal Choice as an Independent Farmer