In a two-person negotiation over a sum of money, one person (the Proposer) makes a single 'take-it-or-leave-it' offer on how to split the sum. The second person (the Responder) can either accept the offer, and the money is split as proposed, or reject it, in which case neither person receives anything. Now, consider a change to this structure: there is still only one Proposer, but there are now two Responders. The Proposer makes an offer, and the first Responder to accept it gets the proposed share. Based on an analysis of the players' incentives, how does this change most likely affect the balance of bargaining power?

Analyzing a Change in Negotiation Rules

Evaluating Bargaining Power Under Different Negotiation Rules

In a one-time negotiation where one person proposes a split of $100 and the other can only accept or reject it (with rejection meaning both get nothing), the proposer's bargaining power is absolute because the responder will logically accept any offer greater than zero.

Analyzing Power Dynamics in a 'Take-It-Or-Leave-It' Negotiation

In a negotiation over a $100 prize, one person (the Proposer) makes a single 'take-it-or-leave-it' offer to a second person (the Responder). If the Responder accepts, the prize is split as proposed. In the standard version, if the Responder rejects the offer, both get $0. Consider a modification to this rule: if the Responder rejects the offer, the Proposer gets $0, but the Responder receives a fixed payment of $10. How does this modification affect the balance of bargaining power?

In a negotiation over a fixed sum of money, a 'Proposer' makes a single offer on how to divide it, and a 'Responder' reacts. Match each variation of this negotiation's rules to the most likely shift in bargaining power.

Analyzing a Negotiation Outcome

Modifying Negotiation Rules to Shift Power

In a negotiation over a $100 prize, a single Responder can accept an offer from one of two Proposers. Both Proposers simultaneously make a 'take-it-or-leave-it' offer. The Responder can see both offers and choose to accept one, in which case the prize is split as proposed with that Proposer. If the Responder rejects both offers, no one receives any money. How does this rule structure, compared to a standard single-Proposer negotiation, most likely affect the distribution of bargaining power?

The Take-it-or-Leave-it Rule and Proposer's Bargaining Power

Responder's Veto Power as a Limit on Proposer's Bargaining Power

Responder Competition Increases Proposer's Bargaining Power

In a one-time negotiation where one person proposes a split of $100 and the other can only accept or reject it (with rejection meaning both get nothing), the proposer's bargaining power is absolute because the responder will logically accept any offer greater than zero.