Concept

Bargaining Stalemate at the Pareto-Efficient Output

At the Pareto-efficient output level, a bargaining impasse occurs. Although the negative externality still exists and harms third parties (e.g., pollution affecting fishermen), it is no longer possible to negotiate a further reduction in output. This is because the maximum amount the affected party would be willing to pay for another reduction is less than the minimum compensation the producers would require to cut production further, making a mutually beneficial agreement for less output impossible.

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Updated 2025-08-29

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