In a one-to-one 'take-it-or-leave-it' bargaining scenario, the person receiving the offer holds power because they can veto an unfair deal, forcing the proposer to make a more equitable offer to avoid getting nothing. The introduction of a second, competing recipient for the same offer fundamentally erodes this veto power.
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Figure 4.20: Rejection Rates in Ultimatum Games with and without Responder Competition
Average Offer Size With and Without Responder Competition
Analysis of Economic Decision-Making Under Competition
Consider two variations of a bargaining experiment where a Proposer offers to split a sum of money. In the first setup, there is a single Responder who can accept or reject the offer. In the second setup, two Responders compete; the first to accept the Proposer's offer gets the money. If a Proposer makes a low, unequal offer in both setups, how would the introduction of a competing Responder likely change the outcome?
The Effect of Competition on Bargaining Behavior
In a one-to-one 'take-it-or-leave-it' bargaining scenario, the person receiving the offer holds power because they can veto an unfair deal, forcing the proposer to make a more equitable offer to avoid getting nothing. The introduction of a second, competing recipient for the same offer fundamentally erodes this veto power.
Evaluating the Impact of Competition on Bargaining Power
In a bargaining game, a 'Proposer' offers a split of a sum of money to a 'Responder'. If the Responder accepts, the money is split as proposed; if they reject, neither party receives anything. Match each variation or principle of this game to its most likely corresponding description.
A 'Proposer' is deciding how to split a sum of money in a one-time interaction. In which of the following scenarios should the Proposer, acting to maximize their own share, logically make the lowest offer to the other party/parties?
Analyzing Responder Behavior Under Competition
An experiment is conducted where a 'Proposer' offers to split $10. The Proposer consistently offers $2 to the other participant(s), keeping $8. The experiment is run under two different conditions, and the results for the 'Responders' who receive the offer are recorded in the table below.
Condition Percentage of Responders Accepting the $2 Offer A: One Proposer, One Responder 58% B: One Proposer, Two Competing Responders 90% Based on this data, what is the most logical conclusion about the effect of competition among Responders?
In a bargaining scenario, a single 'Responder' is offered a small, unequal share of a prize by a 'Proposer.' The Responder might reject this offer out of a sense of fairness, even if it means neither party gets anything. Now, imagine the same low offer is made, but there are two Responders, and the first one to accept gets the share. What is the most accurate explanation for why a Responder in this competitive situation is far more likely to accept the low offer?