Rejection of Hyper-Fair Offers Due to Inequality Aversion and Social Debt
In some cultural contexts, such as in experiments conducted in Papua New Guinea, Responders in the ultimatum game have been observed to reject offers that significantly exceed a 50% share of the total pie. This behavior is driven by two primary motivations: first, a strong aversion to highly unequal outcomes, even when the inequality is in the Responder's favor; and second, a desire to avoid incurring a 'social debt' from accepting a large gift that may be difficult to reciprocate in the future. This indicates that preferences can go beyond simple fairness to include the social implications of an exchange.
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Rejection of Hyper-Fair Offers Due to Inequality Aversion and Social Debt
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