The Instability of the Socially Optimal Climate Outcome
In a strategic interaction between two countries regarding climate policy, the outcome where both countries agree to restrict emissions results in the highest collective benefit. However, this outcome is often described as unstable. Analyze why this socially optimal outcome is not a stable equilibrium, explaining the incentives each country faces.
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