Essay

The Paradox of Inaction in Climate Negotiations

In a two-country climate negotiation modeled as a hawk-dove game, both nations recognize that mutual inaction on emissions will lead to a shared catastrophe. Despite this, a standoff often occurs where neither country is willing to be the first to act. Analyze the conflicting incentives at play for a single country in this scenario that lead to this 'strategic waiting' phenomenon.

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Updated 2025-08-26

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