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Two partners, Partner A and Partner B, are deciding on a business strategy. They can either 'Innovate' or 'Maintain' their current product line. They both benefit most from coordinating their strategies, but each has a different preference. The table below shows the profit (in thousands) for each partner based on their simultaneous decisions. Partner A's profit is the first number in each pair. Which of the following outcomes is a stable equilibrium, meaning neither partner has an incentive to unilaterally change their decision?
| Partner B: Innovate | Partner B: Maintain | |
|---|---|---|
| Partner A: Innovate | (5, 2) | (0, 0) |
| Partner A: Maintain | (0, 0) | (2, 5) |
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