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Calculating the Minimum Wage to Prevent Shirking
A firm is hiring a worker. The worker experiences a 'cost of effort' equivalent to $3 per hour when working diligently. If the worker is caught shirking, they are fired and will receive an unemployment benefit valued at $8 per hour. The firm's monitoring system has a 25% probability of catching a shirking worker in any given hour. What is the minimum hourly wage the firm must pay to ensure the worker chooses to work diligently? (Assume the worker will not shirk if the payoff from working is equal to the expected payoff from shirking).
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Science
Economy
CORE Econ
Social Science
Empirical Science
Economics
Introduction to Microeconomics Course
The Economy 2.0 Microeconomics @ CORE Econ
Ch.6 The firm and its employees - The Economy 2.0 Microeconomics @ CORE Econ
Application in Bloom's Taxonomy
Cognitive Psychology
Psychology
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Satisfying the No-Shirking Condition Motivates Diligent Work
Assumption of No Shirking at Equal Payoffs
A company pays its workers a wage specifically calculated to be just enough to prevent them from shirking (not working diligently). Suppose the government increases the level of unemployment benefits that a worker would receive if they were fired. Holding all other factors constant, how must the company adjust its wage to maintain the same level of employee effort, and what is the reason for this adjustment?
Calculating the Minimum Wage to Prevent Shirking
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An employee earns a wage of $25 per hour. The personal cost (disutility) of working hard is equivalent to $3 per hour. If the employee chooses not to work hard, there is a 40% chance they will be caught and fired. If fired, their next best alternative is an unemployment benefit equivalent to $10 per hour. Based on this information, the condition to ensure the employee does not shirk is met.
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Analyzing the Components of Employee Motivation
Calculating Minimum Detection Probability
In a model where a firm sets a wage to prevent an employee from shirking, if the personal cost of exerting effort for the employee increases, the minimum wage the firm must offer to maintain the same level of diligence must ____.
An employee is deciding whether to work diligently or to shirk, based on the wage offered by their employer and other given conditions. Arrange the following steps in the logical order that represents the employee's decision-making process.
A company pays a wage that is precisely at the level required to prevent employees from shirking. Two events occur simultaneously: 1) The company implements a new management system that significantly increases the probability of detecting a shirking employee. 2) A local economic downturn reduces the value of the unemployment benefits a fired employee would receive. To minimize labor costs while still ensuring employees do not shirk, how should the company adjust the wage it pays?
An employee earns a wage of $25 per hour. The personal cost (disutility) of working hard is equivalent to $3 per hour. If the employee chooses not to work hard, there is a 40% chance they will be caught and fired. If fired, their next best alternative is an unemployment benefit equivalent to $10 per hour. Based on this information, the condition to ensure the employee does not shirk is met.