Fill in the Blank

Consider a strategic interaction between two countries regarding emissions policy, represented by the payoff matrix below (Payoff for Country 1, Payoff for Country 2).

Country 2
RestrictDon't Restrict
Country 1Restrict(6, 6)(2, 9)
Don't Restrict(9, 2)(3, 3)

An international agreement proposes giving a subsidy, S, to any country that chooses to 'Restrict', regardless of the other country's choice. To make the outcome ('Restrict', 'Restrict') a stable equilibrium where neither country has an incentive to change its choice, the value of this subsidy S must be greater than ____.

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Updated 2025-08-26

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