Causation

Employment Rent as an Incentive Against Shirking

A wage that only covers a worker's reservation wage and cost of effort (w = w_r + c) makes them indifferent between working and unemployment. To incentivize effort, a firm must pay an additional premium, the employment rent. This is necessary because it takes time to detect a shirking worker. The rent ensures that the value of keeping the job outweighs the potential gains from shirking, thus motivating the employee to work hard.

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Updated 2026-05-02

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