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Interpreting Experimental Bargaining Results
In an experiment, pairs of anonymous participants play a one-time bargaining game. One participant, the Proposer, is given $100 and must offer a portion of it to the second participant, the Responder. If the Responder accepts, the money is split as proposed. If the Responder rejects, both participants receive nothing.
When this experiment was conducted in two different communities, researchers observed the following patterns:
- Community A: The most frequent offer made by Proposers was $50. Offers below $30 were rejected more than 50% of the time.
- Community B: The most frequent offer made by Proposers was $20. Offers of $20 were almost always accepted.
Based on these results, what can you infer about the likely differences in social norms regarding fairness between these two communities and how those norms influence strategic behavior in this game?
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Library Science
Economics
Economy
Introduction to Microeconomics Course
Social Science
Empirical Science
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CORE Econ
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