Functions of Pirate Institutions as 'Rules of the Game'
The set of written and unwritten rules on a pirate ship functioned as its governing institutions. These institutions served as the 'rules of the game' by establishing both constraints on behavior, such as the 8 p.m. curfew on drinking below deck, and incentives for performance, like rewarding the lookout who first spotted a prize with the best pair of pistols. In game theory terms, these rules defined the parameters of interaction: they specified who was allowed to do what, the timing of their actions, and how those actions would determine the final payoffs for each crew member.
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The Economy 2.0 Microeconomics @ CORE Econ
Ch.5 The rules of the game: Who gets what and why - The Economy 2.0 Microeconomics @ CORE Econ
Introduction to Microeconomics Course
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