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Mitigating Moral Hazard in Unemployment Insurance
Because a government cannot fully observe an unemployed person's job-search effort, unemployment insurance systems use several mechanisms to limit moral hazard. Common approaches include requiring documented evidence of active job search, capping the duration and replacement rate of benefits, monitoring or interviewing recipients, and offering re-employment bonuses that reward finding work quickly. Each mechanism tries to realign the recipient's incentive toward diligent job search while still providing income support.
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Economics
Economy
The Economy 2.0 Microeconomics @ CORE Econ
CORE Econ
Social Science
Empirical Science
Science
Introduction to Microeconomics Course
The Economy 2.0 Macroeconomics @ CORE Econ
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