Theory

Modeling the Responder's Reciprocity Motive

A Responder's reciprocal motives can be formally modeled by assuming that their anger towards an unfair offer is proportional to the size of the social norm violation. Consequently, the satisfaction a Responder derives from rejecting an offer—and thereby punishing the Proposer—depends on how much the offer falls short of the established norm. This 'rejection satisfaction' is inversely related to the offer amount; the lower the offer, the greater the satisfaction from rejecting it. If an offer meets or exceeds the norm, such as an offer of $50 in a 50-50 split scenario, there is no incentive to punish, and thus no satisfaction is gained from rejection.

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Updated 2026-05-02

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