Universal Rejection of Zero Offers in the Ultimatum Game
In ultimatum game experiments conducted across different cultural groups, such as Kenyan farmers and US students, a consistent finding is that no Responder will accept an offer of zero. This behavior highlights a strong preference to punish the Proposer for a completely unfair offer, ensuring that the Proposer also receives nothing, even though this aligns with the Responder's own payoff from rejection.
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Introduction to Microeconomics Course
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CORE Econ
Ch.4 Strategic interactions and social dilemmas - The Economy 2.0 Microeconomics @ CORE Econ
The Economy 2.0 Microeconomics @ CORE Econ
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Universal Rejection of Zero Offers in the Ultimatum Game
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Learn After
In a one-shot interaction, a 'Proposer' is given $100 and must offer a portion of it to a 'Responder'. The Responder can either accept the offer, in which case they both get the proposed amounts, or reject it, in which case both get $0. If the Proposer offers the Responder $0, which of the following best analyzes the Responder's most likely decision and its underlying motivation, based on consistent experimental findings?
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Experimental studies of a game where one person (the 'Proposer') offers a share of a sum of money to another person (the 'Responder') have been conducted with diverse groups, including university students in the United States and farmers in rural Kenya. A consistent finding is that when the Proposer offers the Responder $0, the Responder almost always rejects the offer, resulting in both individuals receiving nothing. What is the most significant conclusion that can be drawn from this cross-cultural consistency?
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