Causation

Principal's Response to Suboptimal Agent Care

In a hidden-action scenario, the agent's choice to exert a level of care that is privately optimal but socially insufficient increases the probability of a bad outcome. The principal, anticipating this behavior, compensates for the heightened risk by raising the price of the contract, such as by charging a higher insurance premium or a higher interest rate on a loan.

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Updated 2026-05-02

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