The Credibility Gap: Actions vs. Announcements
A central bank publicly commits to a 2% inflation target, aiming to stabilize public expectations. However, over the subsequent five years, its policy decisions result in an average inflation rate of 5%. Analyze the likely consequences of this persistent gap between the stated target and the actual outcome on the inflation expectations of households and firms. In your analysis, explain why a central bank's actions are often more influential than its announcements in shaping public belief about future inflation.
0
1
Tags
Economics
Economy
Introduction to Macroeconomics Course
Ch.5 Macroeconomic policy: Inflation and unemployment - The Economy 2.0 Macroeconomics @ CORE Econ
The Economy 2.0 Macroeconomics @ CORE Econ
CORE Econ
Social Science
Empirical Science
Science
Analysis in Bloom's Taxonomy
Cognitive Psychology
Psychology
Related
The Impact of Anchored Expectations on Disinflation Costs
Central Bank Credibility and Inflation Expectations
Consider two countries, both with a stated inflation target of 2%. The central bank in Country A has a long and consistent track record of meeting this target, earning significant public trust. In contrast, the central bank in Country B has frequently missed its target, and its policy announcements are often viewed with skepticism. If both countries experience an identical, temporary external shock that pushes current inflation to 5%, how would the public's long-term wage and price-setting behavior most likely differ between the two countries?
The Credibility Gap: Actions vs. Announcements
True or False: If a central bank has established high credibility and successfully anchored the public's inflation expectations at 2%, a sudden, temporary increase in oil prices that pushes current inflation to 5% will likely cause long-term wage negotiations to immediately incorporate an expectation of 5% future inflation.
The Challenge of Building Credibility