Essay

The Shadow of the Future: Incentives in Repeated Interactions

Imagine two individuals who repeatedly face a situation where they can either cooperate for a moderate mutual gain or act selfishly for a large personal gain at the other's expense (if the other cooperates). In a single, one-time interaction, the purely self-interested choice is to act selfishly. Explain why this logic might change if the individuals know they will interact repeatedly. In your answer, analyze the mechanism through which the prospect of future interactions can encourage cooperation in the present.

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Updated 2025-08-06

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