Hidden-Action Mechanism of Moral Hazard in Home Price Insurance
Home price insurance can weaken maintenance incentives because insurers cannot readily observe a homeowner's upkeep. Property value depends on both this hidden effort and broader market conditions, while insurance protects the homeowner from some losses reflected in the insured outcome. This separation between effort and financial consequences creates moral hazard by encouraging less maintenance after coverage is obtained.
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Economics
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The Economy 2.0 Microeconomics @ CORE Econ
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The Economy 2.0 Macroeconomics @ CORE Econ
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Hidden-Action Mechanism of Moral Hazard in Home Price Insurance