Variation in Initial Contribution Levels: Copenhagen vs. Melbourne
While high initial contributions were a common feature across all locations in the worldwide public good game, the starting levels of cooperation varied significantly. For instance, participants in Copenhagen made much larger contributions in the first period compared to participants in Melbourne. This demonstrates that even the initial willingness to cooperate is not uniform across different societies.
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Ch.4 Strategic interactions and social dilemmas - The Economy 2.0 Microeconomics @ CORE Econ
The Economy 2.0 Microeconomics @ CORE Econ
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Variation in Initial Contribution Levels: Copenhagen vs. Melbourne
Variation in Initial Contribution Levels: Copenhagen vs. Melbourne
Learn After
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