Comparing Payoffs for Maria's Shirking vs. No-Shirking Options (Figure 6.9)

Employee's Optimal Effort Decision

An employee earns $20 per hour. They can choose to exert full effort, which they experience as a cost equivalent to $3 per hour. Alternatively, they can exert no effort. If they exert no effort, there is a 10% chance each hour that they will be caught and lose their job. The total economic loss if they are fired is valued at $120. To maximize their net hourly gain, what is the employee's best course of action?

An employee is paid a wage where their net benefit from working hard is exactly equal to their expected net benefit from shirking. The firm then invests in a new surveillance system that increases the probability of detecting a shirking employee. Assuming the wage and all other conditions remain the same, how does this change affect the employee's best response?

Evaluating a Manager's Wage Strategy

An employee receives an hourly wage of $25. The personal cost (disutility) of exerting full effort is equivalent to $4 per hour. If this employee were to be fired, the total economic loss is valued at $150. At what hourly probability of being caught for not exerting effort would the employee be exactly indifferent between working with full effort and not exerting effort?

An employee is paid an hourly wage and has determined that their best response is to exert full effort. This is because the net benefit from working hard is currently greater than the expected net benefit from shirking. Which of the following changes, holding all else constant, would be most likely to cause this employee to change their best response to shirking?

An employee earns an hourly wage and experiences a disutility of effort equivalent to $2 per hour when working diligently. If they choose not to work diligently, there is a 5% chance per hour of being caught and fired. For the employee to be motivated to work diligently, the total economic loss from being fired must be at least $____.

Consulting on Employee Motivation

A firm operates in a city where the cost of job loss for an employee is high. The government then introduces a new policy that substantially increases unemployment benefits. Assuming the firm does not change the wage or its monitoring practices, how will this policy change likely affect a typical employee's decision-making process regarding work effort?

A manager wants to ensure an employee exerts effort. The personal cost (disutility) of exerting effort for the employee is valued at $2 per hour. The total economic loss for the employee if they are fired is estimated to be $80. What is the minimum hourly probability of detecting an employee who is not working that the manager must establish to make working diligently the employee's best response?

Employee's Decision Calculus: The Role of Future Consequences

Expected Shirking Duration (s) as a Best Estimate Under Uncertainty

Maria's Two Choices: Exerting Effort vs. Shirking

Assumption of Using Expected Shirking Duration in Payoff Calculation