Analyzing the Impact of Anonymity on Bargaining Behavior
Consider two versions of a one-shot bargaining experiment where a 'Proposer' is given $100 to split with a 'Responder'. The Responder can accept the offer (both get the proposed amounts) or reject it (both get nothing).
- Scenario A: The Proposer and Responder are in the same room and know they will see each other after the experiment.
- Scenario B: The interaction is completely anonymous. The Proposer and Responder are in different rooms, interact through a computer, and are assured their identities will never be revealed to anyone.
Compare the average offer you would expect Proposers to make in Scenario B versus Scenario A. Justify your prediction by explaining which social preferences (e.g., self-interest, fairness, fear of rejection) are likely to be strengthened or weakened by the change in conditions.
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Introduction to Microeconomics Course
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CORE Econ
Ch.4 Strategic interactions and social dilemmas - The Economy 2.0 Microeconomics @ CORE Econ
The Economy 2.0 Microeconomics @ CORE Econ
Analysis in Bloom's Taxonomy
Cognitive Psychology
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