Consider the following payoff matrix for two competing companies, InnovateCorp and TechGiant, deciding whether to 'Cooperate' (limit R&D spending) or 'Defect' (increase R&D spending). The first number in each cell represents InnovateCorp's profit, and the second represents TechGiant's profit (in millions).
| TechGiant: Cooperate | TechGiant: Defect | |
|---|---|---|
| InnovateCorp: Cooperate | (10, 10) | (2, 15) |
| InnovateCorp: Defect | (15, 2) | (5, 5) |
Assuming InnovateCorp believes TechGiant will choose to 'Cooperate', what is the specific reason InnovateCorp has an incentive to 'Defect'?
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Consider the following payoff matrix for two competing companies, InnovateCorp and TechGiant, deciding whether to 'Cooperate' (limit R&D spending) or 'Defect' (increase R&D spending). The first number in each cell represents InnovateCorp's profit, and the second represents TechGiant's profit (in millions).
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