Design of a Worldwide Public Good Game Experiment

Benedikt Herrmann

Christian Thoni

Simon Gachter

Science (Journal)

In a public goods experiment, four participants are each given $20 and can contribute any amount to a group project. For every dollar contributed, each of the four members receives a $0.40 return. After contributions are revealed, participants have the option to pay a small fee to reduce another player's earnings. Player 1 contributes $18, Player 2 contributes $15, Player 3 contributes $16, and Player 4 contributes $1. After seeing these results, Player 4 pays a fee to reduce Player 1's earnings. Based on experimental findings from a large cross-societal study on this topic, what is the most accurate classification of Player 4's action?

Critique of a Cross-Societal Public Goods Experiment

Consider an economic system where the state owns all major means of production, such as factories and machinery. The state leases this equipment to private individuals who then hire workers in a competitive labor market and sell the resulting products in a competitive goods market, aiming to make a personal profit. Based on the core institutional definition of an economic system centered on private property, markets, and firms, why would this system not be classified as capitalist?

Interpreting Punishment Patterns in Public Goods Games

Predicting Punishment Behavior in a Public Goods Game

A large-scale economic experiment was conducted in cities around the world. In the experiment, groups of four anonymous individuals played a game for ten rounds. In each round, players received an endowment and could contribute to a group project. After contributions were revealed, players had the option to pay a fee to reduce the earnings of other players. What was the primary research objective of comparing the results from the different cities?

In a large-scale public goods experiment conducted across many different societies, it was found that giving participants the ability to financially penalize others after observing their contributions consistently increased the overall level of cooperation in all societies studied.

In a public goods experiment, participants contribute to a group project and then have the option to pay to reduce the earnings of other players. Match each type of punishment behavior with the description of the action that best defines it.

In a large-scale economic experiment, groups of four anonymous individuals played a game for ten rounds. In each round, players received an endowment and could contribute to a group project that benefited all members. After contributions were revealed, players had the option to pay a fee to reduce the earnings of other players. The experiment was run in two different cities, City A and City B, with the following results:

• In City A, punishment was almost exclusively used against individuals who contributed very little to the group project. Average contributions in this city increased significantly over the ten rounds.
• In City B, punishment was frequently used not only against low contributors but also against individuals who contributed much more than the group average. Average contributions in this city did not increase and sometimes fell over the ten rounds.

Based on these experimental findings, what is the most likely inference about the general social norms in these two cities?

Significance of Cross-Societal Punishment Findings

Interpreting Punishment Patterns in Public Goods Games