Source Study: Antisocial Punishment Across Societies (Herrmann, Thoni, & Gachter, 2008)
The worldwide public goods experiment on cooperative behavior and punishment was detailed in the 2008 research paper 'Antisocial Punishment Across Societies' by Benedikt Herrmann, Christian Thoni, and Simon Gachter. Published in the journal Science (Volume 319, Issue 5868, pages 1362–67), this study is the primary source for the experiment's design and the data presented, including the findings shown in Figures 4.14b and 4.14c.
0
1
Tags
Library Science
Economics
Economy
Social Science
Empirical Science
Science
CORE Econ
Introduction to Microeconomics Course
Ch.4 Strategic interactions and social dilemmas - The Economy 2.0 Microeconomics @ CORE Econ
Related
Laboratory Experiments on Cooperation in the Prisoners' Dilemma
Evidence from Economic Games: Self-Interest is a Minority Behavior
Source Study: Antisocial Punishment Across Societies (Herrmann, Thoni, & Gachter, 2008)
Analogy Between Economic Experiments and Mendel's Method
University Laboratories as a Setting for Economic Experiments
Key Research and Researchers in Experimental Economics
Field Experiments (Randomized Control Trials) in Economics
Ultimatum Game
Use of Monetary Stakes in Economic Experiments to Ensure Realistic Behavior
Influence of Game Rules (Structural Power) on Bargaining Outcomes
Interpreting Experimental Economic Data
An economist develops a new theory about how individuals decide whether to contribute to a shared resource. What is the primary reason for using a controlled laboratory experiment to investigate this theory?
Designing an Experiment to Test Fairness
Match each key feature of a controlled economic experiment with its primary purpose in understanding human decision-making.
A researcher conducts an experiment where participants are given $10 and can anonymously give any amount to a stranger. Most participants give some money away. A critic argues this result is meaningless for understanding real-world economics because the experiment takes place in an artificial lab, not in a real market. The critic's argument is valid because the primary goal of such economic experiments is to perfectly replicate naturally occurring situations.
Analyzing Experimental Results to Understand Behavior
Analyzing the Impact of Rule Changes in an Economic Experiment
Evaluating an Experimental Design
In a controlled experiment, two anonymous participants are assigned roles. Player 1 is given $20 and must propose how to split it with Player 2. Player 2 can either accept the proposed split, in which case both players are paid accordingly, or reject it, in which case both players receive nothing. The most common proposal from Player 1 is a $10/$10 split, and proposals where Player 1 offers less than $5 are almost always rejected by Player 2. What is the most logical conclusion that can be drawn from these results?
An economist wants to study how small-scale farmers decide whether to adopt a new, more expensive but potentially more profitable type of seed. They are considering two research methods:
- Method A: A controlled experiment in a university computer lab where farmers are given information and a sum of money, and they play a game that simulates the risks and rewards of choosing the new seed versus their traditional seed.
- Method B: A field study where a random group of farmers in a village is offered a discount on the new seed, and their adoption rate is compared to another random group in the same village that was not offered the discount.
Which statement best evaluates the primary trade-off between these two methods for understanding the farmers' decision-making?
Methodology of Controlled Economic Experiments: Isolating Variables
Learn After
Design of a Worldwide Public Good Game Experiment
Benedikt Herrmann
Christian Thoni
Simon Gachter
Science (Journal)
In a public goods experiment, four participants are each given $20 and can contribute any amount to a group project. For every dollar contributed, each of the four members receives a $0.40 return. After contributions are revealed, participants have the option to pay a small fee to reduce another player's earnings. Player 1 contributes $18, Player 2 contributes $15, Player 3 contributes $16, and Player 4 contributes $1. After seeing these results, Player 4 pays a fee to reduce Player 1's earnings. Based on experimental findings from a large cross-societal study on this topic, what is the most accurate classification of Player 4's action?
Critique of a Cross-Societal Public Goods Experiment
Consider an economic system where the state owns all major means of production, such as factories and machinery. The state leases this equipment to private individuals who then hire workers in a competitive labor market and sell the resulting products in a competitive goods market, aiming to make a personal profit. Based on the core institutional definition of an economic system centered on private property, markets, and firms, why would this system not be classified as capitalist?
Interpreting Punishment Patterns in Public Goods Games
Predicting Punishment Behavior in a Public Goods Game
A large-scale economic experiment was conducted in cities around the world. In the experiment, groups of four anonymous individuals played a game for ten rounds. In each round, players received an endowment and could contribute to a group project. After contributions were revealed, players had the option to pay a fee to reduce the earnings of other players. What was the primary research objective of comparing the results from the different cities?
In a large-scale public goods experiment conducted across many different societies, it was found that giving participants the ability to financially penalize others after observing their contributions consistently increased the overall level of cooperation in all societies studied.
In a public goods experiment, participants contribute to a group project and then have the option to pay to reduce the earnings of other players. Match each type of punishment behavior with the description of the action that best defines it.
In a large-scale economic experiment, groups of four anonymous individuals played a game for ten rounds. In each round, players received an endowment and could contribute to a group project that benefited all members. After contributions were revealed, players had the option to pay a fee to reduce the earnings of other players. The experiment was run in two different cities, City A and City B, with the following results:
- In City A, punishment was almost exclusively used against individuals who contributed very little to the group project. Average contributions in this city increased significantly over the ten rounds.
- In City B, punishment was frequently used not only against low contributors but also against individuals who contributed much more than the group average. Average contributions in this city did not increase and sometimes fell over the ten rounds.
Based on these experimental findings, what is the most likely inference about the general social norms in these two cities?
Significance of Cross-Societal Punishment Findings
Interpreting Punishment Patterns in Public Goods Games