Sustaining Contributions with the Threat of Punishment
In the worldwide public good game, some cities demonstrated that the mere threat of punishment was effective in maintaining cooperation. In these locations, the availability of a penalty mechanism was sufficient to prevent the decline in contributions that typically occurs over successive rounds.
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Social Science
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CORE Econ
Economy
Economics
Introduction to Microeconomics Course
The Economy 2.0 Microeconomics @ CORE Econ
Ch.4 Strategic interactions and social dilemmas - The Economy 2.0 Microeconomics @ CORE Econ
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