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Comparison

Pareto Incomparability of (I, I) and (T, I) Allocations in the Pest Control Game

The Pareto criterion cannot be used to rank the (I, I) and (T, I) allocations in the pest control game. This is because moving from the (T, I) allocation, with payoffs (4, 1), to the (I, I) allocation, with payoffs (3, 3), would make Anil worse off as his payoff decreases from 4 to 3. Conversely, moving from (I, I) to (T, I) would make Bala worse off, as her payoff decreases from 3 to 1. Since any move between these two states harms one of the players, neither allocation Pareto-dominates the other. The text suggests that while one might find other reasons to prefer one allocation, the Pareto criterion itself cannot rank them.

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Updated 2026-05-02

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