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Coordination in the Driving Game: An Example of Multiple Nash Equilibria

The decision of which side of the road to drive on is a classic coordination game with two Nash equilibria. An individual driver's best response is to conform to the prevailing convention to avoid a collision. If other drivers are on the right, the best response is to also drive on the right. Similarly, if others are on the left, driving on the left is the best response. This results in two stable equilibria: one where everyone drives on the right, as is the convention in the US, and another where everyone drives on the left, as seen in Japan. In either equilibrium, no single driver has an incentive to unilaterally change their behavior.

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Updated 2026-05-02

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