Adverse Selection in Health Insurance
In contrast to an idealized market with symmetric uncertainty, a health insurance market with asymmetric information is prone to adverse selection. This problem arises because individuals have more knowledge about their own health risks than insurers do. Consequently, healthier, low-risk individuals may find a uniform premium—calculated for the average person—to be too expensive and choose not to buy insurance. This leaves a riskier pool of policyholders, which can drive up premiums and potentially cause the market to fail for many.
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Ch.10 Market successes and failures: The societal effects of private decisions - The Economy 2.0 Microeconomics @ CORE Econ
The Economy 2.0 Microeconomics @ CORE Econ
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